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"I remember hiding in an oven when I was ten," she lamented. "The Germans had 
broken down our door and were demanding to take all the children away from our parents, 
probably to kill us first. \~'hen they peeked in oven ;vindow, I held my breath and prayed that 
the pots and pans were piled over my head because if not, I would be burned alive. That's 
when I first knew of fear."1 The months that followed Thomai Stephan's first encounter with 
German "hunters" as she deemed them, were no less frightening or menacing than the day she 
hid in the oven. Soon after the hunters left her village in northern Greece, Thomai and her 
family labored through a series of barriers to escape her now occupied community. "Oh it was 
petrifying. They stole all of our animals so that we'd starve; we ran into the caves and hid for 
days so they wouldn't find us; and when more came in from Macedonia, everyone dug a secret 
trench with a wooden cover piled under dirt and waited tor their footsteps to soften-that day 
I almost suffocated to death."" 
Her memories are shocking though this is only a small portion of what the little girl 
experienced when the Axis powers came to Greece during the Second World War. By the time 
Germans ravaged her village of Hiliothendro, the war had been ingrained in the lives of Greek 
peasants tor seven months. W'hat is most interesting about the German invasion is that Greece 
had been petitioning the all-powerful United States of America for more than half a year to 
obtain some sort of relief from this uncalled for aggression. Sadly, the Americans failed to 
answer the call of their fellow man. 
Before delving into this intriguing subject matter, it must be noted that recent 
scholarship in this area is scarce, at best. One reason for this shortage is the perception that the 
arsenal of democracy pitted against the spreading threat of communism, resulting in the Cold 
\'Var after \\'\'VII, touched on larger eastern European nations during the 1940s which 
subsequently became Russia's Iron Curtain nations. Greece fought heavily to escape from 
under those gates and since her economic impact during the Second World War was not widely 
felt in Europe, she is sadly forgotten in this political game of communal chess. 
Sparse publications are also a problem due to the complexity of research individuals 
must undergo in order to uncover just what happened during those tense years during the 
inYasion of Greece. President Roosevelt had a long history \vith the U.S. Ambassador to 
Greece, Lincoln .\[acVeagh and his personal, private correspondence with this man often 
re,·ealed more about the federal barriers to aid for Greece than those formal, congressional 
letters sent back to the ambassador in the midst of gunfire and bombshells. Thus, placing this 
Balkan country in the proper context of the political turmoil of the early-mid Twentieth 
Century globally, in Europe, and even within Greece itself draws the \'lrriter into a web of 
intricate quandaries with which only time and analysis can untangle. Regardless of its difficulty 
to explore, the interplay between the United States and Greece during the Invasion of Greece 
is a pertinent portion of history which has been sadly overlooked for the last sixty years. 
As for America's reasons for refusing to assist their long-time European ally, they are 
more complicated than one may surmise. American relief efforts wei'!! established for Greece, but 
1 Thomai Stephan, telephone interview by author, 17 March 2006, Wichita, KS to 
Cincinnati, OH. 
2Ibid. 
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not until 1947-two years after the end of 'W\'{11 and five years after the Greeks desperately 
required material. To determine why this aid was so late in coming to the Balkan peninsula, four 
major factors must be examined: if any previous American efforts to assist Greece in war had 
been established; President Franklin Delano Roosevelt's (FDR) interest in sending arms in \X\'{11 
to a nation that may draw attention to a German attack on his own land; the interest of the U.S. 
Ambassador to Greece, Lincoln l\IacVeagh, in reporting the matters of a minor Balkan state to 
America; and the evolution public opinion of up to the early 1940s. 
The threat of invasion begins for Greece with the Great Depression. Numerous 
political parties representing separate factions in Greece were formed in the 1930s, all hoping to 
rearrange the Greek government in their favor since it had been in violently unstable for the last 
hundred years. As the Communist Party of Greece began instigating political uproar against 
followers of Greece's leader, King George II's, the King soon appointed austere General Ioannis 
Metaxas as his Prime Minister in 1936. After crushing all opposing political parties, Metaxas 
prepared Greece for the employment of an authoritarian government, in part to quell what he 
knew would soon transpire: a war with Italy. Metaxas' judgement was wise; shortly before World 
War II in 1939, Italy annexed their neighbor, Albania. Repeating its formula from World War I, 
the nation of Greece immediately chose an official policy of neutrality with its surrounding, 
combative nations. Unofticially the nation was sympathetic towards British efforts due to their 
long-standing, positive relations for over a century. Greece also held on to an unstated anti-
German sentiment, stemming from their King's choice to wed a German, not Greek, bride, which 
only heightened the public's desire to avoid German occupation) Unfortunately, hopes of 
remammg neutral and out of Germany's reach would soon be abandoned. 
In 1940 while Adolf Hitler was focusing his attention towards capturing the Soviet 
Union in Operation Barbarossa, his collaborator, Benito Mussolini (II Duce) was making plans to 
equal his fame and honor to that of Hitler's. Mussolini's original scheme to boost his reputation 
hovered around an invasion of Yugoslavia and subsequent base with which to acquire needed 
resources from Russian dominated nations, especially oil. Yugoslavia was attractive to the Italian 
leader because the country was only second in production to raw materials-Romania produced 
an impressive six million tons of oil per year. If seized, Yugoslavia would also serve as a base to 
steal Romanian materials. But the problem with a Yugoslavian takeover was two fold. First, 
Yugoslavia currently was a buffer zone between Hitler and Mussolini's spheres of influence, 
meaning that its Italian occupation would likely cause Hitler to retaliate and create an even larger 
war. Second, the nation was determined to possess a military too strong for the Italians to defeat 
on their own. So the plan was axed. Another way into the Balkans was through Greece. The 
Balkan peninsula, Mussolini reasoned, would secure an orbit of Italian domination, serve as a 
stepping stone to Romania, and threaten British standing in the Mediterranean simultaneously. Il 
Duce fancifully believed Balkan control would restore Italy's ancient command encircling what 
the Romans called "Mare Nostrum" (Our Sea).4 
To materialize these dreams, on August 15, 1940, Mussolini ordered one of his 
submarines to torpedo a Greek cruiser. After two months of silence between the two nations, 
Il Duce creatively cited that he was compelled to attack Greece since the Greek government 
3 S. Victor Papacosma, The Alilitary in Greek Politics: The 1909 Coup d'Etat (Cleveland: 
Kent State University Press, 1977), ix, 1-14; Jon V. Kofas, Authorianism in Greece, the Metaxas Rex,ime 
(New York: Columbia University Press, 1983), 168-174. 
4 M. K. Dziewanowski, War at Atry Price: World lf/ar II in Europe, 1939-1945 (Englewood 
Clifs, NJ: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1987), 148-151; Anita J. Prazmowska, Eastern Europe and the Ori,gin.r of 
the Second World !f'"1ar (New York: St. Martins' Press, 2000), 186-195; For the President: Personal and 
Secret: Correspondence Between Franklin D. Roosez•elt and William C. Bttllitt, Orville H. Bullitt, ed. (New 
York: Houghton Mifflin CO., 1972), 409, interestingly, William C. Bullitt, was the Secretarv of 
State during World War II and was one of the first officials in Washington to hear about the 
invasion of Greece in the early 1940s and prevent future destruction in the nation, before the 
Germans were to plunder the area in 1941. Bullitt paid little attention to affairs in the Balkans. In 
his memoirs, he only speaks of Greece twice: first to mention Mussolini's plan to invade the area 
and second to study why the Germans were able to overtake the region so easily. 
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had not followed a policy of neutrality and was in fact permitting the British to host air and 
naval bases on their lands. Faced with Mussolini's ultimatum, General Metaxas, who believed 
the Italians did not have the martial support to induce a successful invasion, responded to the 
Italian leader in a one-word telegram: "Oxi!" (No!).s 
Based on this insulting response Mussolini ordered his soldiers into the Grecian 
border on October 28<h, 1940. Meta.xas maintained a strong counteroffensive and cautiously 
permitted a few British divisions to occupy the mainland with Royal Air Force (RAF) 
squadrons to reinforce Greek air defenses. In addition, massive groups of guerrilla fighters 
independently fought to dispel the Italians and, due to the intricacies of the rugged, deceptive, 
mountainous Greek landscape, largely succeeded. But when it was clear to the Italian dictator 
that the Greeks may soon announce victory and that this may persuade Yugoslavia and 
Turkey to support them against Italy, Hitler was informed of Mussolini's brash actions; he 
was more than outraged.6 
Surprised by the Grecian triumph and upset at Mussolini's defeat from a nation 
sustained by aid from his adversary, Britain, Hitler decided to intervene with German forces 
that December, upsetting his schedule to execute Operation Barbarossa. In an effort to make 
up for lost time, in 1941 Hider went after both Yugoslavia and Greece concurrently. Once 
Yugoslavian forces dissolved along the Grecian border, Metaxas' reluctance to accept any and 
all British aid they offered, expired. Britain, in its own predicament, was caught between 
leaving forces to defend disputed territory in North Africa, like Tripoli, and sending forces to 
Greece. Keeping troops around Tripoli would secure a southern base with which to attack 
Sicily, prevent an Axis invasion of Egypt, and possiblv of the J'viiddle East as well. Sending the 
majority of those troops to Greece would prevent Britain from being portrayed as militarily 
weak, which could threaten support from powerful political allies such as the U.S.S.R. and the 
United States later in the war.7 
Britain sided in Greece's favor. In order to compensate for the difference in Italian 
\"ersus German military strength, Britain pulled most of its North African troops, along with 
new men from Indian, Australian, and New Zealand units, to fortify Grecian lines. Nearly 
56,000 men traveled to the Balkan peninsula in a matter of days. As for the Greek army, over 
half of their men were still focused on keeping Italians behind Albanian lines instead of 
bolstering the "Metaxas line" against Bulgaria which held back the incoming Germans. Due to 
this lapse in proper strategy and the poor organization of guerrilla fighters, the Germans were 
able to conquer the Greek mainland systematically. Once the British and Germans were 
embroiled in heavy combat, British General Maitland \X'ilson called for an evacuation, mainly 
to Crete, and saved 43,000 of his men; fifteen-thousand had already become casualties.s 
Before 30,000 of those evacuated secured the island, the Greek military's defense of 
Crete consisted of only one infantry regiment, three coastal defense and antiaircraft batteries, 
and twenty-four antiquated planes. With a defense like this, even Mussolini could have come 
back for a second chance at victorv. In any event British war veteran, Major General Bernard C. 
Freyberg, commanded his fatigued, shell-shocked soldiers into Crete. Expectedly he faced 
staunch opposition from German military expert, General Karl Student, and his able-bodied 
men, full of the air power and equipment. Britain now lacked these attributes since no other 
major nations, like the United States, would lend material support. Foolishly Freyberg focused 
5 Kofas, AuthorianiSHI in Greece, the Metaxas Regime, 17 4-1 H9; Dziewanowski, w-ar at AID' 
Price: lf''orld W?ar II in E11rope, 1939-1945, 150-151; "Memorandum by the Director of Political 
Department," Doc11ments on German Foreign Policy, 1918-1945, Series D *1937-1945), vol. XII: The 
War Years, February 1-June 22, 1941, (GPO, Washington D.C.: 1962), 106-107. 
6 Charles Cruickshank, Greece, 1940-1941 (Newark, NJ: University of Delaware Press, 
1976), 37 -51; Dziewanowski, !f'ar at Atry Price: lf;orld IFarll in Europe, 1939-1945, 150-151. 
Cruickshank, Greece, 1940-1941, 73-86; Dziewanowski, !f?ar at Any Pn"ce: IForld !f'ar II 
in Europe, 1939-1945, 156-157. 
B Dziewanowski, WaratAtry Price: World Warll in Europe, 1939-1945, 158-159; Churchill 
and RooseJ•elt: Tbe Complete Comspondence: III. Alliance Declining, February 1944-Apri/1945, Warren F. 
Kimball, ed. (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1984), 202. 
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on possible amphibious landings since the British were not able to secure more planes to fight 
an air attack. By May 20th, 1941, this proved to be a serious error in his judgement. General 
Student had chosen a three-pronged air offensive on Crete, inflicting serious wounds upon the 
British. The invasion of Crete was a soaring victory for German air forces and a serious blow for 
the British military and the independence and neutrality of Greece. Once Hitler had secured the 
Balkans, he turned his attention back to Soviet Russia.9 
As for those still within the borders of Greece, Germans continued to loot their 
homes, kill their family members, and starve them to death. When the Germans departed at the 
end of the war, Greece was unable to recover economically, politically, or socially from the 
ordeal. According to the author of By Fire and Axe: The Communist Parry and the Citi/ War in 
Greece, 1944-1949 and first hand participant, Evangelos Averoff-Tossizza, the first appearance 
of a Greek civil war was seen toward the end of German occupation. Much of the grassroots 
combat and resistance that occurred during the invasion of Greece was the product of the 
Communist's National Liberation Front (EAM) and its military, the People's National Army of 
Liberation (ELAS). As the Germans abandoned Greece, Britain reconstituted the former 
Royalist Greek government and attempted to include EAM-ELAS members into power in 
order to avoid future conflict. W'hen those leaders naively refused to participate in the 
reorganization process, skirmishes between the Royalists and Communists ensued. 10 
Consequently, Josip Broz Tito, leader of Communist Yugoslavia, supported the 
EAM-ELAS bloc, forcing Britain to return to Greece with 40,000 troops and a large amount of 
monetary aid for Greek Royalists. Once financial concerns arose in Britain two years after the 
end of WWII, the United States finally carne to the aid of their Balkan ally and helped push 
back EAM-ELAS forces. President Truman's grant of S400 million to quell these problems on 
the Balkan peninsula was permitted by Congress in agreement with his newly issued Truman 
Doctrine. This legislation allowed the U.S. to come to the aid of nations, like Greece, 
defending themselves against Communist forces. Later and without question, it was the 
continued American, not British, effort into Greece under their Marshall Plan-a program to 
revitalize European economies and strengthen them against Communist threats-that 
miraculously restored order to the Greek government in the tense decades after the civil war. 
American influence in the Balkans clearly was substantial.'' 
By observing the significant influence the United States had upon the future of 
Greece, and the large cost Americans spent to ensure Greek freedom, the question must be 
asked as to why America did not come to the aid of Greece before the chaos of a civil war 
eventuated. Surely by helping the British and guerilla Greek fighters during the im·asion, 
America would not haYe had to invest economically in securing Greek freedom against 
Communism so heavily after \'1/\'1/Il. Moreover, if the British and American governments were 
willing to work together during the war to secure the Balkan peninsula from a German attack, 
the tremendous expenses incurred by the use of the Marshall Plan in Greece may not have 
been needed. An Axis invasion in the face of British sea and American land and air power 
would have been short lived, if at all. Most importantly, the Americans would not have had to 
financially support Greece into the 1950s, and to such a large degree, had their aid come to the 
Greeks when they initially petitioned for it--during their invasion from 1940-1941. 1 ~ 
\Vhat makes America's lack of interest in Greece even more perplexing is that 
Americans previously were responsible for supplying the nation with large amounts of aid 
9 Cruickshank, Greece, 1940-1941, 156-163;. Dziewanowski, W'ar at Any Price: World War 
II in Europe, 1939-1945, 160-162. 
10 Evangelos Averoff-Tossizza, B] Fire and Ice: The Communist Parry and the Ci~7"/ W"ar in 
Greece, 1944-1949, translated by Sarah Arnold Rigos (New Rochelle, NY: Caratzas Brothers, 
Publishers, 1978), 24-37. 
II Ibid., 136-152; C.M. Woodhouse, The Stmgg/e for Greece, 1941-1949 (London: Hart-
Davis, MacGibbon, 1976), 234-247. 
'~Woodhouse, The Stmgg/e for Greece, 1941-194 9, 245-259. Thomas Parrish, Room•e/t and 
marsha//, Partners in Politics and lv"ar (New York: William Morrow and Co., Inc., 1989), 511. 
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during another war of aggression against them-not from Germany, but Turkey. In 1821, the 
Turk's Ottoman Empire in Grecian lands had deteriorated so much that rebel Greek leaders 
were able to create a national campaign of resistance against such rule. Much like the later 
German invasion, in order to obtain their independence successfully, Greece required aid from 
other more stable and financially sound nations. Just like the German invasion, America was 
called upon relief. Despite President James Monroe's recent enacted policy of non-intervention 
in European affairs, he could not help but challenge the Ottoman enemies of national freedom 
and liberty for the Greeks. In addition to protecting shipping rights for America, the popular 
American sentiment concerning the Greek Revolution, despite the Monroe Doctrine, was to 
suspend isolationism in favor of helping their fellow man acquire freedom.l3 One century later 
Greece was, again, fighting their adversary in order to regain liberty and freedom from an 
oppressive nation. Just like with the Revolution, it was the president who made the final 
decision during the invasion as to whether that aid would be sent to Greece. 
In 1940, that President was Franklin D. Roosevelt. And while it would easy to state 
that Roosevelt's strong support of an evolved non-intervention policy is what kept America 
from assisting Greek fighters, that assumption would be wrong. From his initial election to the 
end of the Greek invasion in 1941, President Roosevelt remained remarkably divided between 
balancing his personal views of American involvement with foreign issues versus a national 
disposition towards isolationism that, since the Greek War for Independence, had grown 
substantially.l4 Had Roosevelt been given the unrestricted authority to im·olve his nation with 
World War II, he would have sent aid, in some form, to the Greeks during their invasion. But 
by the time the invasion was reported to him in autumn of 1940, he had experienced the 
American public's strong attitude for isolationism to the point at which he knew he could not 
chance entering the nation into the war and remain president of one of the most int1uential 
nations on earth. 
\V'here the President was first familiarized with the public's strong opinion against 
assisting Europe began years before the invasion. Following his introduction of the Good 
Neighbor Policy to respect Latin American issues and governments, Roosevelt was faced with 
a number of Neutrality Acts that rapidly passed through Congress in the mid-late 1930s. These 
acts were increasingly supported by the American people the more stringent they became in 
preventing U.S. arms to be shipped to belligerent nations--though a clear distinction as to who 
was the aggressor was not specified. In response, Roosevelt increasingly opposed these acts 
since they castigated t•ictim.r of aggression, like those from Italy's recent attack on Abyssinia and 
the Axis' future attack on Greece, who could truly use the help of American materials. To the 
further disappointment of Roosevelt, the acts additionally confined his personal right as 
President to aid amicable nations. Due to its overwhelming popularity with American citizens, 
FDR grudgingly singed the last act in 1937. \X'hen World War II exploded across Europe in 
1939, he was compelled by his own character to take action and investigate the degree to which 
his presidential powers permitted him to help friendly European nations . .\Iost notably this 
endeavor is disco~;·ered as Roosevelt engaged in a secret, recurring correspondence with British 
Prime Minister Winston Churchill that dealt with how the Allied power faired in \X'\'\'II 
without America's official participation. Many times the two men were found discussing ways 
to sidestep the Neutrality Acts.lS 
Interestingly, and probably a result of these conspicuous talks, when Hitler was 
planning to attack Britain in 1940, Roose\·elt sought to shift public isolationist opinion softlv 
13 Paul Constantine Pappas, The United States and tbe Greek W'ar for Indepmdence, 1821-
1828 (New York: C.olumbia Uni,·ersity Press, 1985), wi, xiv-xvi. 
14 Wayne S. Cole, Room·elt and the Isolationists, 193245 ( lincoln, NE: University of 
Nebraska Press, 1983), 163-179; Whitney H. Shepardson and \X'illiam 0. Scroggs, The United 
States i11 W'orld Affairs: An Account of American Fore.(gn Relations, 1940 (New York: Harper and 
Brothers, 1941), 350-351, 354. 
lSibid.; &osewlt a11d ChurchilL· Their Secret lfVartime Comspondence, Francis L. Loewenheim, 
Harold D. Langley, and .\[anfred Jonas, eds. (New York: Sarurday Review Press/E.P.Dutton and 
Co., Inc., 1975), 81, 156, 159-169. 
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by creating the Committee to Defend America by Aiding the Allies (CDAAA). The CDAAA, 
chaired by like-minded presidential appointees, Henry L. Stimson and Frank Knox, Secretaries 
of War and Navy, sent American military material to Great Britain. In order not to disobey 
public sentiments, the CDAAA was classified as being a pro-aid organization, not technically 
attempting to engage in WWII, though it obviously countered the Neutrality Acts.16 
Certainly Roosevelt's desire to avert U.S. participation can be attributed to the fact 
that the Battle of Britain, like the invasion of Greece, occurred during an election year. Making 
bold moves to involve uninterested voters in another \Vorld War would do nothing for his 
campaign but result in his failure to be reelected. Beyond the loss of employment, Roosevelt 
would have also forfeited his powerful position to fascinate American relief efforts in 
European affairs for an extended period of time. Once his inauguration was complete, 
Roosevelt would have at least four solid years to lead the American war response than had he 
engaged in stronger diplomatic relations with Greece the year it was invaded--coinciding with 
the election. 
The President further sought to assist friendly European nations but creating the 
Lend-Lease agreement between America and Britain where massive military and economic aid 
was sent to the United Kingdom, that in turn helped other nations suffering under the threat of 
Axis domination. Sadly for Greece, however, Lend-Lease was implemented just after Britain 
withdrew from the Greek mainland during their invasion-a decision made in response to the 
lack of support given to Greece by other major nations. Had Roosevelt negotiated Lend-Lease 
with Britain before the Axis attack on the Balkan peninsula, the approaching Greek civil war, 
with all of its lasting and serious consequences for Greece, may have been averted.F After all, 
America did pay for British troops to remain in Greece in 194 7 and put down their civil war 
once financial problems in the United Kingdom were too numerous to continue defending the 
nation single-handedly. 
The problem with attributing the age-old policy of non-intervention as to why 
Americans did not aid Greece appears too simplistic. In 1821, not only did the American 
government provide necessary material to fight of Turks, but wealthy Greek-Americans 
donated substantial amounts of funding to the project in hopes that their relatives would 
obtain the liberty and freedom Greeks in the states had. 18 Surely the descendants of these 
wealthy individuals still existed in World \'liar II and could donate again to the Greek cause. 
Wbat caused such a stir in America over the Revolution in the 1800s was the American press' 
intense portrayal of the trauma Greeks were experiencing within their lands. Major 
contributors came from Philadelphia once the 1\'ational Gazette said that the Greek cause was 
"sacred and solemn." "Greek fever" spread around America so fast that the i"\ew York 
16Donald F. Drummond, The Passing of ~Anmican Neutrality, 1937-1941 (Ann Arbor: 
University of l\fichigan Press, 1955), 181. 
17 Ibid., 208-210, 212. It should be noted that as soon as Congress approved Lend-
Lease and Roosevelt officially was permitted to help victims of Axis he immediately 
sent relief to Greece. In particular the President authorized a number French 75s located in 
Fort Bragg, North Carolina to be shipped to the Balkan State in haste. By this point Greek 
guerrilla resistance had been for over half a year and once the Germans invaded in the 
spring of 1941, the Greeks had no more arms to forestall German occupation. By the time 
American weapons reached Grecian shores, it was too late. "American Sending Guns to Greece," 
The Times (London) 1 Apr. 1941,2. 
18 Pappas, Tbe United States and t/;e Greek War for Independence, 27-43; Roosevelt's anti-
isolationist views went so deep that in 1941, four days before he knew Germany would ravage 
Greece in a land attack, he issued a statement to the press saying that he wanted the American 
people to truly know the events of World War II, in whole. Though Roosevelt had no formal 
means of controlling radio or newspapers strictly by utilizing his Presidential powers, he states 
that he would not want to thwart such communication '1\'ith events transpiring in the world. 
Perhaps if the American people came to realize, on their own, that an American invasion would 
occur, they would loosen their ties to isolationism and support relief efforts to countries alreadv in 
need, like Greece, "Says Roosevelt Bars Censorship," Tbe NeiJ' York Times, 2 Apr. 1941, 2. 
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Commercial Adtutiserstated that "We cannot keep the record of the numerous meetings called in 
every part of the country to procure aid for the Greek cause."l9 Since American media outlets 
had increased extensively in the hundred years following the Revolution, it would be logical to 
conclude that Americans would have helped again if they knew about the sufferings in 1940s 
Greece. One of the most crucial means for the American press to obtain knowledge of the 
severity of the Grecian conflict is by sifting through documents written by America's 
ambassador in Greece, Lincoln MacVeagh, who, day by day, chronicled Axis bombings of the 
land. Likewise, it would be understandable to belie\·e that Roosevelt's failure to the Grecian 
campaign was the result of a lack of information on the subject reported to him by the 
ambassador. 
If MacVeagh was indifferent to the invasion of Greece, then the insufficiency of 
reports to the U.S. government on the crisis would be understandable-especially since Greece 
was one of the poorest and politically unstable European nations during the war. Its strategic 
value to the U.S. paled in comparison to nations with similar invasions, like France or Britain, 
where aid would have been received before Greece for that reason. But blaming the lack of 
U.S. aid to Greece squarely on the shoulders of Lincoln MacVeagh is unfounded for a myriad 
of reasons; namely that the Ambassador's lm·e of Greece was a lifelong affair. 
As the member of an affluent family, MacVeagh's education was filled with courses 
in Classical Greek that sparked his interest in ancient philosophy so deeply that he earned a 
Harvard degree in it in 1913-condensing his schooling into three years. In 1917 he chose to 
marry Margaret Charlton Lewis, whose fluency was in both classical and modern Greek. Over 
two-decades before he was appointed Ambassador to Greece, MacVeagh began reading the 
newspapers of Athens while teaching their young daughter, Margaret Ewen, Greek as well. 
Once he established a successful career with the Henry Holt Publishing Co., MacVeagh and his 
family traveled to Europe, his favorite stop being Greece, and read aloud from the ancient 
texts of Herodotus and Xenophon as they visited the historical sites. By the early 1930s his 
passion for Greece found its way into his prh·ate diaries where words like "It's a genuine place 
landJ there is no limit to its future," are intertwined with his believe that the ancient nation was 
on the doorsill of new economic and social development. "The story of modern Greece is 
really amazing," he notes, they "are my passion in life!" Only one year after these remarks, 
Roose\·elt appointed him as the U.S. Ambassador to Greece in 1933.2° 
What further topples the assumption that MacVeagh did not care to report to 
Washington the seriousness of the invasion is his lifelong friendship with the President, 
himself. Though his brothers went to the same high school as FDR-Groton, MacVeagh's first 
close interaction with the Roosevelts was at Harvard when FDR's brother-in-law (and 
Eleanor's brother), G. Hall Roosevelt, roomed >Vith the future Ambassador.21 MacVeagh even 
had one of the Roosevelts become the godparent to his newly born daughter. In any event, 
from this point forward MacVeagh kept in touch >Vith FDR on a regular basis. When 
i\IacVeagh formally asked FDR to be appointed as the Ambassador to Greece, he solidified 
that his political beliefs were nearly identical to the President's, not to the policy of 
isolationism. ~facVeagh proclaimed that his appointment would allow PDR to "have another 
pair of your own eyes in Greece if I were there .... you can't have too many people working 
for you who are devoted to you."22 Thus, MacVeagh, more than any other possible candidate 
to be the Ambassador to Greece, would have made it a point to broadcast Grecian difficulties 
to those who could do something about them in Washington D.C. 
Moreover, MacVeagh's determination to transmit his sentiments about the invasion 
were so pervasive that it became his life. He would purposely stay up late into the evening to 
keep a personal diary of his time in Greece and write personal letters to President Roosevelt 
19 Pappas, The United States and the Greek War jor Independence, 37. 
20 Ambassador A1acVeagh Reports: Greece, 1933-1947, John 0. Iatrides, ed. (Princeton: 
Princeton University Press, 1980), 4-6; quotes, 6, 8. 
2 1Hall was affectionately known to FDR and MacVeagh as "Smouch," A!JJbassador 
MacVeagh Reports, 4-5. 
22 Ambassador A1acVe'{g-h Reports, 4-7; quote 7. 
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that specifically pertained to Greece and what he was trying to do with the State Department to 
acguire American aid for them. MacVeagh did become the eyes and ears of Roosevelt in 
Greece since his personal communication with the man occurred nearly everyday during the 
war years. These letters, which were supposed to concern the personal relationship between he 
and the President, became much like the President's secret correspondence to Churchill. 
MacVeagh's correspondence was an obligue means of informing Roosevelt of the Grecian 
conflict, sans interference from the State Department, and guiding him to look for ways to 
assist the Greeks. Rarely did these personal documents relate to anything personal about 
MacVeagh's life or that of the President's. 
In fact, while Mac V eagh was writing about the invasion to the President by night, 
he reported on the invasion to the U.S. Department of State by day. Of course MacVeagh's 
governmental letters are of a much more stoic, resolute tone, especially when conversing 
with other Balkan ambassadors, but they do prove that he was actively, incessantly, trying to 
get aid to the Greeks in their time of need. Sadly the destruction becomes so great in the 
ancient nation that the leader of Greece, himself, King George II, personally has MacVeagh 
send a message directly to President Roosevelt for help, thought it is intercepted by a 
member of the State Department instead. The Department expressly replied to the 
distraught King by saying "it is the settled policy of the United States Government to extend 
aid to those governments and peoples who defend themselves against aggression," and that 
'W'ashington assures "steps are being taken to extend such aid to Greece." In reality, the 
words of United States Government were filled with nothing but lies. King George II's plea 
was received in Washington at the beginning of December in 1940; when Germany occupied 
Greece the following Spring, absolutely no federal aid had docked in its Mediterranean 
harbors.23 
Finally, MacVeagh's devotion to help Greeks with American resources becomes so 
great that by winter of 1940, nearly everyday thereafter he laments to Roosevelt about the 
Balkan state's need for American weapons, especially 100 air planes, even saying that Greece 
has mustered up enough funds to pay for the bill, immediately and in full. What is most 
abhorrent about the situation is that, in order to guell the carping Ambassador, the State 
Department began informing him that needed supplies and planes had been on their way to 
Greece, starting in late November. In February he guestioned the Department's integrity by 
asserting, "I trust our authorities will not be insensible of such heroic resolution. Greece's 
failure to obtain any planes whatever from the United States of America after 3 months of 
effort has been heartbreaking." By March of the following year when word of a German 
invasion was rampant in the Balkans, MacVeagh had realized that the State Department's 
claims were meaningless.24 
23 "King George II of Greece to President Roosevelt," Department of State, Foreign 
Relations of the United States, Diplomatic Papers, 1940, 5 vols. (GPO, Washington D.C.: 1958), vol. III: 
The British Commonwealth, The Soviet Union, The Near East and Africa, 568; "The Secretary of 
State to the i\Iinister in Greece (MacVeagh), Washington, December 6, 1940-3 p.m." 
Department of State, Foreign Relations of the United States, Diplomatic Papers, 1940, 5 vols. (GPO, 
Washington D.C.: 1958), vol. III: The British Commonwealth, The Soviet Union, The Near East 
and Africa, 569; guotes, 569. 
24 Ambassador .'\JacVea,gh Reports, 255-321; guote, 298. Because little to no media was 
present in Greece during the last phases of the Axis invasion, many Greek officials did not know 
what was preventing American relief from arriving on their shores. Since the Greek leader was an 
all-powerful King, many Greeks concluded that it was the United States' leader, President 
Roosevelt, who did not wish to involve his nation with European matters. In an effort to assuage 
this difference, Mr. Plytas, the Mayor of Athens, gave a telegram to MacVeagh to send directly to 
the President. It stated that the City Fathers of Athens in Council decided to make Roosevelt an 
Honorary Citizen of the City and name on of its chief avenues after him. Before he sent it off at 
the end of March in 1941, MacVeagh felt so bad about the imperding slaughter of Greeks by an 
imminent German invasion given the failure to send promised artillery from America, that he 
personally told the State Department to tell the President that Athens had never before named a 
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Disgusted with the reaction of his nation at the atrocity befalling Greece, 
MacVeagh sent in a formal letter of resignation to the Department of State, citing that his 
requests in the Balkan Peninsula were completely fruitless, if the Department listened to 
them at all. Greece was such a secondary concern for the Department in the 1930s-early 
1940s that they grouped the nation's documents not with U.S. foreign relations pertaining to 
Europe, but with their relations pertaining to Africa and the Near East-neither places of 
which Greece is located correctly.25 
When the Germans began invading in spring, MacVeagh had the option of fleeing 
from the country like many other international diplomats and officials had in the preceding 
days and weeks. In the thick of bullet fire, exploding bombs, and slicing knives the 
Ambassador writes in his diary that the Greeks "would, in fact, feel a little more confident .. 
. if [thevj knew that the American Minister were here during the first dark days."26 
.MacVeagh's love of Greece became so great during his time as their American Ambassador 
that he was willing to suffer through the war with them. 
So if the lack of American relief to Greece was not the fault of Roosevelt or 
.\IacVeagh, then the question remains as to whom or what was the culprit preventing the 
requests of these men from being granted. That explanation can be found in one deep-rooted 
policy of the American public: isolationism. In the words of American historian, John E. Wiltz, 
"From its birth the United States had enjoyed security to a degree unparalleled in the history of 
modern nations."27 Geographically, the Pacific and Atlantic Oceans prevented uncomplicated 
attacks by Asia or Europe upon their lands, while most American energy had been focused on 
exploring its own land and seeking to resemble Europe as little as possible-hence their 
separation from England in the 1700s. Though isolationist policies weakened the following 
century--a case in point is America's aid in the War for Greek Independence, by 1918 the 
overall result of American participation in the First World \"'ar was a resurgence of American 
detachment from international issues. As Wiltz explains, "Despite Wilson's exalted ideas the 
war had been a European affair, fought over European problems, for European ends. No 
American interest ... had been at stake."28 
In conjunction, 'World War I caused a substantial amount of disillusion in America 
due to the postwar debt they acquired from this European venture. Though American troops 
technically were not fighting until the end of the conflict, Americans, in an effort to strengthen 
diplomatic relations with their European allies, had been supporting those nations with goods 
and funds for a large portion of the war. Once the devastating effects of the Great Depression 
compounded the loss of funds donated to the war effort, American attitudes towards helping 
their neighbors across the pond soured. In addition, unlike the War for Independence in 1821, 
the e\·ents preceding the invasion of Greece in 1940 consisted of the Americans engaging in 
the most total, gruesome, and violent war mankind had ever seen29• They were shocked by it; 
their families had been torn apart or lost in it; and they \·owed never again to chance 
participation in another world war, for any price. 
major avenue after a foreigner. His efforts were futile when, two weeks after the telegram was 
sent, the Germans reached northern Greece and began butchering poor farmers . . Ambassador 
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Consequently, when veterans recounted their horrific memories and still asked for 
unpaid dues from their participation in the first of these World Wars, general American 
sympathy for those caught in the invasion of Greece quickly dissolved. The unparalleled 
carnage Americans experienced in World War I was enough to prevent even Greek-American 
families, who had donated to Greece in the 1800s, from becoming the harbingers of aid to 
Greece in W\VIJ.3U 
By the late 1930s, when it was clear that European powers were preparing for 
another international conflict and Americans had not yet overcome the pains of World War I, a 
constitutional amendment was proposed by Indiana Representative Louis Ludlow which 
represented the public opinion since World War I. It stated that unless an invasion of the 
United States or its territories occurred, Congress' authority to declare war would not be 
affirmed until a national referendum secured a majority vote on the matter. Ludlow's idea made 
the path towards American intervention in Greece that much more narrow to walk.31 
Also although newly elected President Franklin Delano Roosevelt's (FDR) "New 
Deal" campaign supported isolationism by focusing American energies inward for economic 
repair from the Depression, social and political unrest became exceedingly ubiquitous in the 
world around him. As the war neared, he would find it harder and harder to separate his people 
from the world's accelerating chaos. During the interwar period, for example, Francisco Franco 
and other military leaders staged a coup d'etat and subsequent Spanish Civil War; Japan 
invaded Manchuria, killing nearly 400,000 civilians and prisoners of Nanking; and Adolf Hitler 
was elected Chancellor of Germany-shortly thereafter he opened his first concentration camp 
at Dachau.32 And while Grecian cont1icts in the 1930s were not of this magnitude, a simple 
attack by another nation upon them would, sooner or later, require Americans to open their 
eyes to European issues. As history would dictate, the time for Americans to awaken from 
isolationism and help their fellow man in the Balkans would not come until 1947. The State 
Department's apathy for MacVeagh's pleas from 1940-1941, then, was the government's 
submission to its nation's request. 
Indeed, it was not the disinterest of President Roosevelt or Ambassador MacVeagh, 
or even a lack of experience in sending assistance to Greece that caused such an impediment 
during the German invasion of their lands. On the contrary, it was the American people, shell-
shocked and enraged at the atrocities they experienced by intervening in a European affair, 
which ultimately granted the Germans full access to Grecian lands. By the late 1930s the 
undertones of isolationism in America had matured into a stit1ing cloud which citizens could 
not rise above to see the brutality being int1icted upon their Balkan neighbor. In essence, Lady 
Liberty had turned a blind eye to the sufferings of Greece. 
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45. 
31 Drummond, The Passing of American Neutrality, 1937-1941, 59, 108. 
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